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This is an excellent paper on the e⁄ects of government spending that is
well worth studying. Most of my discussion focuses on the background and
motivation for the analysis. I begin by describing what it is about the current
economic situation in the US and other countries which motivates interest in
the economic e⁄ects of government spending. Perhaps the natural place to
look for information on the e⁄ects of government spending is the time series
data. I review the information in the US time series data since 1940 using
the di⁄erent approaches taken by Ramey and Hall in this volume. I show
that whatever information there is in the data about the e⁄ects of government
spending primarily stems from the Korean War and World War II episodes. I
explain why the evidence on the government spending multiplier (i.e., the output
e⁄ect of an increase in government spending) in these episodes is probably of
limited value from the perspective of the current situation. This is why it
is important to study other sources of evidence on the multiplier. This paper
studies such other evidence by examining the response of consumption and labor
in a cross section of states of the United States. As the authors themselves
emphasize, however, inferring information on the multiplier from the evidence
they gather is problematic. Still, the work they do is important because it
clari￿es some of the channels by which government spending a⁄ects household
decisions.
1 One Set of Reasons for Taking an Interest in
the E⁄ects of Government Spending
The authors￿work can be appreciated from many di⁄erent angles and I begin
by describing one of them. There is widespread concern in the United States
and other countries about the weak level of economic activity and high level of
unemployment since 2008. One view is that the low level of activity re￿ ects a
failure of aggregate demand. A popular version of this view holds that the failure
of aggregate demand stems from reduced spending by households and others
as they struggle to reduce their levels of debt. In models of well-functioning
markets, this kind of situation would trigger a fall in the relative price of current
goods (i.e., the real interest rate), thus encouraging other people (e.g., the people
who own the debt of the heavily indebted people) to shift expenditures away
from future goods and towards present goods. In this way, the price mechanism
minimizes what would otherwise be a waste of the resources available for current
production. The aggregate demand failure view holds that, for various reasons,
1I am very grateful for discussions with Benjamin Johannsen. I am particularly grateful
for his assistance on the computations for Valerie Ramey￿ s vector autoregression, reported
below.
1the fall in the real interest rate just described is prevented from occurring. To





where Rt denotes the gross nominal rate of interest and ￿e
t+1 denotes the public￿ s
expectation of in￿ ation. In the US and other countries, the nominal rate of
interest is near its lower bound of unity. At the same time, ￿e
t+1 does not
rise, presumably because of the credibility of central banks￿commitment to low
in￿ ation. According to the aggregate demand failure view of the current slump,
the inability of the real rate of interest to fall su¢ ciently is the cause of the low
current rate of utilization of capital and labor.
Various policies have been proposed for addressing the problem of low aggre-
gate demand. One set of policies would use various types of taxes to stimulate
spending (see, e.g., Correia, Fahri, Nicolini and Teles (2010)). Another set
of policies would directly boost aggregate demand by increasing government
spending (see, e.g., Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2011) and Eggertsson
(2010)). Those who argue for government spending note that low utilization of
resources suggests the bene￿ts, net of the social cost, of additional spending is
high. For example, unemployed teachers could be working to raise the human
capital of children. Layed-o⁄ construction workers could be doing much-needed
repairs to crumbling US infrastructure. Proponents of government spending
also note that ￿nancial markets are willing to lend funds to the US Federal
government at virtually zero interest.
A key question, in evaluating government spending as a way to help get us
out of the current slump, is how much will it boost output? If for every bridge
the government repairs, a factory somewhere else goes unbuilt, then it is not so
obvious that government spending is desirable. A rise in government spending
could in principle even have a negative e⁄ect on output if it creates large enough
tax distortions either through standard deadweight loss e⁄ects or by creating a
climate of uncertainty.2
These considerations are what motivate interest in the size of the govern-
ment spending multiplier, the ratio of the increase in output divided by the
increase in government spending. The objective of this paper is to shed light
on the government spending multiplier using data and a minimum of economic
assumptions. Of course, in this endeavor it is important that the evidence be
drawn from circumstances that resemble our current situation. That is, we are
interested in the e⁄ects of an increase in government spending that (i) must
presumably be ￿nanced eventually, but not by an immediate rise in taxes; (ii)
is most likely temporary; and (iii) is unlikely to be accompanied by a rise in the
nominal rate of interest, since the zero bound on that rate appears to be very
binding.
2See Baker, Bloom and Davis (2011).
22 Time Series Evidence
The amount of relevant information in the time series about the government
spending multiplier appears to be limited. Consider, for example, the vector
autoregression (VAR) study in Valerie Ramey￿ s contribution to this volume.
The three panels in Figure 1 display the implications of her ￿ News EVAR￿VAR
for the government spending multiplier. For the purpose of these calculations,

















Here, ￿ Yt and ￿ Gt denote the responses in GDP and government spending, re-
spectively, to a government spending news shock. Also, the real interest rate,
r; was set to 3.6 percent, at an annual rate.
The calculations in Figure 1 were performed as follows. The vector of vari-
ables, yt; in the VAR (kindly provided by Valerie Ramey) is de￿ned as follows:
yt =
￿
PVt=GDPt￿1 logGt log(GDPt ￿ Gt) Rt average marginal tax rate
￿0
:
Here, Gt denotes Federal, State and Local Government purchases of goods and
services, GDPt denotes real gross domestic product in quarter t; Rt denotes
the three month Treasury bill rate and the last variable is an estimate of the
average marginal tax rate constructed by Barro and Redlick (2011). The vari-
able, PVt; is Ramey￿ s measure of the present discounted value of government
spending. Following Ramey, the VAR includes a constant, four lags of yt and
a quadratic time trend. I compute the innovation to PVt=GDPt￿1 (the ￿ news
shock￿ ) applying the approach in Ramey￿ s ￿ News EVAR￿speci￿cation.3 The
posterior distribution of the multiplier using several sample periods is reported
in Figure 1.4 The top panel in Figure 1 displays the posterior distribution when
the whole sample of data is used. The mode is below unity, and the distribu-
tion is moderately spread out. The middle distribution excludes the World War
II period and note how the posterior distribution fans out substantially more.
Finally, the distribution in the bottom panel drops both the World War II and
3The average value of the private spending to government spending ratio,
(GDPt ￿ Gt)=Gt; in the data set is 3.76. Then, ￿ Yt = 3:76 ￿ ^ y3;t + ^ y2;t and ￿ Gt = ^ y2;t;
yt =
￿
y1;t y2;t y3;t y4;t y5;t
￿
and a hat over a variable indicates its impulse re-
sponse to the news shock.
4The posterior distribution was computed using the MCMC algorithm. The results in
Figure 1 make use of a ￿at prior on the VAR parameters. The computations were also
performed with a ￿ Minnesota prior￿and the results were virtually the same. Let ￿ denote
the vector of VAR parameters. Corresponding to each MCMC draw of ￿; impulse responses
in
￿￿ Yt; ￿ Gt
￿
to a news shock were computed and these were used to compute the multiplier
de￿ned in the text (the in￿nite sum was truncated at horizon 500). A large number of ￿￿ s was
drawn using the MCMC algorithm and the multiplier was computed in each case. Figure 1
displays the resulting histogram of the multiplier.
3Korean episodes. Note that now the data are essentially completely uninfor-
mative about the multiplier. I conclude that the only information about the
multiplier comes from the Korea and World War II episodes.5
My next time series evidence uses the methodology and annual data covering
1930-2008 used by Hall in his paper in this volume.6 The data are the annual
change in military spending and the annual change in real GDP, each divided
by lagged GDP. Let the military spending variable be denoted mt and let GDP
growth be denoted by yt: The scatter plot of mt and yt is displayed in Figure
2. As a benchmark, I also display the curve, yt = a+mt; where a is the sample
mean of yt minus the sample mean of mt: The data in Figure 2 are di⁄erentiated
according to whether they belong to the World War II period, the period of the
Korean War or other periods.
Note ￿rst that there is very little variation in military spending outside of
the two war periods (see the observations indicated by a ￿ +￿ ). With so little
variation, we do not expect to be able to get a precise measure of the multiplier,
dyt=dmt; from these observations. Still, the least squares line computed using
these data imply a very small multiplier, 0.45 (see Table 1). The observations
indicated by circles correspond to the Korean War. There is notably more
variation in mt in the Korean war period. Those observations generally lie
along a line that is ￿ atter than the 45 degree line, so that those data suggest
the multiplier is below unity. According to Table 1, the least squares estimate of
the multiplier is 0.90. Finally, the greatest degree of variation in mt is exhibited
by the World War II data. Those observations lie along a line noticeably ￿ atter
than the benchmark curve. This is why, according to Table 1, the least squares
estimate of the multiplier for that period is so small, 0.51.
The evidence in Figure 1 is consistent with the implications of the Ramey
VAR analysis. Most of the information about the multiplier in the time series
comes from World War II and the Korean war. Moreover, they do not provide
much support for the notion that the multiplier is much larger than unity.
Table 1: Least squares regression estimates of yt = a + bmt
yt ~ GDP growth, mt ~ (military spendingt￿military spendingt￿1)/GDPt￿1
Sample period a b
non-war period 0.03 0.45
World War II 0.06 0.51
Korea 0.02 0.90
Whole sample, 1930-2008 0.03 0.55
But, is the evidence on the government spending multiplier from the two wars
relevant to the current situation? Part of the answer can be seen in Figure 3.
The top panel displays the Barro and Redlick (2011) tax data. Note that in each
of World War II and the Korean War, there was a sharp rise in taxes. So, those
5A version of Figure 1 as computed using Ramey￿ s ￿ Blanchard-Perotti SVAR￿approach,
with similar results.
6These were kindlly provided by Hall in an excel ￿le with the name, "Fig weights, Tables
VARs and regs".
4episodes do not share characteristic (i) in the current situation, that the rise in
government spending is not likely to be accompanied by a rise in taxes right
away. The top panel displays Hall￿ s data on the log of real defense spending.
Note that the expansion in military spending in the Korean war turned out to be
essentially permanent. To the extent that people has a sense of this in real time
- perhaps they interpreted Korea as the ￿rst battle in a long (mostly) cold war
- they would have viewed the rise in military spending as being persistent. In
this respect, the Korean war episode does not satisfy our characteristic (ii), that
it be temporary.7 Finally, rationing in World War II greatly biases estimates of
the multiplier based on that period. Arithmetic requires that for the multiplier
to be big, private spending must increase. But, under rationing this possibility
is ruled out by law. For these reasons, the US time series data beginning with
World War II appear to have little information about the government spending
multiplier that is relevant for the current situation.
Interestingly, Gordon and Krenn (2011) argue that the two years right be-
fore the entry of the US into World War II do provide information about the
government spending multiplier that is relevant to present circumstances. Mil-
itary spending began to rise sharply ￿...starting in June 1940, fully 18 months
before Pearl Harbor￿(abstract, Gordon and Krenn (2011)). They note that the
interest rate was roughly constant during that period, so that is it consistent
(iii) above. Also, there was no rationing at that time and there was consider-
able slack in the economy, as there has been in the US economy in recent years.
Gordon and Krenn (2011) argue that the quarterly data on this period warrant
the conclusion that the multiplier is as high as 2.5. This is an important obser-
vation. Still, given the short sample on which it is based, it is important to ￿nd
additional corroborating evidence.
3 Observations on the Paper
The preceding observations make clear why the topic of this paper is important.
In addition, my brief summary of the time series evidence suggests that addi-
tional sources of information about the multiplier are needed. Exploiting one
such source of information is the stated objective of this paper.
The authors study the household consumption and labor supply response
to a government spending shock. Identi￿cation proceeds as in Nakamura and
Steinsson (2011). When government spending increases, its distribution across
states of the United States is not completely predictable. States that receive an
unexpectedly high share of government spending experience a positive spending
7It is not clear what the direction of bias might be. The impact of the persistence of
government spending shocks on the spending multiplier is not robust across dynamic economic
models. According to a real business cycle model, the more persistent is the rise in government
spending the greater is the government spending multiplier. This re￿ects the negative wealth
e⁄ect of government spending on labor supply. The New Keynesian model de-emphasizes
labor supply. As a result, the more persistent is a government spending shock in that model,
the smaller is the multiplier. This re￿ects the negative wealth e⁄ect on consumption. See
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2011) for further discussion.
5shock and states that receive an unexpectedly low share of government spending
receive a negative spending shock. Because of the richness of the authors￿data
set, they can identify how di⁄erent types of households in a state respond to a
state government spending shock and how their responses might vary over the
business cycle. This type of information is of great interest for understanding
how people respond to shocks.
As the authors themselves emphasize, it is not so clear whether the analysis
sheds light speci￿cally on the government spending multiplier as discussed in
the ￿rst section above. For example, the positive spending shock received by a
state under the authors￿identi￿cation generates virtually no need for additional
future taxes. The reason is that if one dollar of additional government spending
￿nds its way into a particular state, the extra taxes to ￿nance that extra dollar
are paid by all states. As a result, one of the objectives of the research appears
not to be possible. It is not possible to use the authors￿analysis to determine
whether the transmission mechanism for government spending implied by the
IS-LM model corresponds better with the data than the mechanism implied
by intertemporal models like the real business cycle model. A key di⁄erence
between these models is that households in the former ignore future taxes, while
households in the latter fully internalize them.
Perhaps a better way to think of the analysis in the paper is to think of the
states of the United States as separate, small open economies.8 In e⁄ect, a rise
in government spending in a particular state is equivalent to a rise in that state￿ s
exports. When a country experiences a rise in export demand, there is no sense
in which the citizens expect to pay higher taxes in the future to ￿nance those
exports. Thinking of the analysis as shedding light on the e⁄ects of an export
shock may also clarify some results which at ￿rst seem puzzling. For example,
the authors ￿nd that low income households respond to a rise in government
spending shocks by working longer hours and consuming less. High income
households respond by consuming more. Pursuing the small open economy
idea, imagine that each state is a small open economy with a traded good and a
non-traded good sector. Suppose that a state experiences a rise in government
spending in the form of increased government purchases from the state￿ s higher
income people. Suppose also that this increases the rent those people earn on
their human and physical capital. Because the increased government spend-
ing raises their wealth, the higher income people respond by purchasing more
consumption goods, including non-tradable consumption goods. This raises the
price of non-tradable consumption goods and in e⁄ect acts as a tax on the low
income people. This negative wealth e⁄ect su⁄ered by poor people causes them
to work harder and consume less.
8This is an interpretation of this type of analysis stressed in Nakamura and Steinsson
(2011).
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log, real defense spending
Jump in military spending may have been interpreted as 
‘permanent’, the first battle in the cold war.
Sharp rise in taxes